Student Speech and the First Amendment: A Comprehensive Approach by Goldman, Lee
Florida Law Review
Volume 63 | Issue 2 Article 3
2-8-2013
Student Speech and the First Amendment: A
Comprehensive Approach
Lee Goldman
goldmanl@udmercy.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Education Law Commons, First Amendment
Commons, and the Internet Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Florida Law Review by
an authorized administrator of UF Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact outler@law.ufl.edu.
Recommended Citation
Lee Goldman, Student Speech and the First Amendment: A Comprehensive Approach, 63 Fla. L. Rev. 395 (2011).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol63/iss2/3
395 
 
STUDENT SPEECH AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT: A 
COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH 
Lee Goldman

 
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................... 396 
 
I. CASE BACKGROUND ................................................................ 398 
 A. The Supreme Court Cases ................................................. 398 
 B.  Lower Courts‟ Interpretations of the Supreme 
 Court Cases ........................................................................ 404 
 
II. A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO SCHOOL SPEECH  
 ISSUES ...................................................................................... 406 
 A. Special Characteristics of the School Environment .......... 406 
 B. Rules for Student Speech Outside School  
  Supervision ........................................................................ 407 
  1. Rule and Justifications ................................................ 407 
  2. Supreme Court Support for Full First  
   Amendment for Student Speech Outside  
   School Supervision ..................................................... 410 
  3. True Threats ................................................................ 411 
  4. The Special Case of Cyberbullying ............................. 413 
 C. Rule for Student Speech Occurring Under School  
  Supervision ........................................................................ 417 
  1. General Approach ....................................................... 417 
  2. Factors to Consider When Determining  
   Whether Tinker‘s ―Substantial Disruption‖  
   Standard Has Been Met ............................................... 419 
 a. Curricular Matters ................................................. 419 
 b. Location of Speech ................................................ 420 
 c. Type of Restriction—Discriminatory or  
  Neutral? ................................................................. 420 
 d. Effect on Political Institutions ............................... 421 
 e. Effect on Rights of Others .................................... 421 
 f. Age of Students ..................................................... 422 
 g. Criticism of School Officials ................................ 422 
 h. Experience ............................................................. 422 
  3. Concluding Thoughts About the Proposed  
   Balancing Test for Speech Under School  
   Supervision ................................................................. 423 
 D. Classifying Speech as Outside or Under School  
  Supervision when There Are Elements of Both ................. 423 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                     
  Professor of Law, University of Detroit-Mercy School of Law, J.D. 1979, Order of the 
Coif, Stanford University School of Law.  
1
Goldman: Student Speech and the First Amendment: A Comprehensive Approach
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2011
396 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63 
 
III. ILLUSTRATIVE APPLICATION TO LOWER COURT CASES ............ 425 
 A. Layshock v. Hermitage School District ............................ 425 
 B. J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain School District ....... 428 
 C. Mardis v. Hannibal Public School District ....................... 429 
 
CONCLUSION .................................................................................. 430 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Can a school discipline a student for creating a vulgar parody profile of 
the school principal or another student on the website MySpace? Can it 
preclude a student from wearing at school a T-shirt that reads, 
―Homosexuality is shameful‖? These are some of the difficult issues raised 
when students‘ First Amendment rights clash with schools‘ operational 
needs and custodial responsibilities. 
The Supreme Court has addressed students‘ First Amendment speech 
rights on several occasions, most recently in Morse v. Frederick.
1
 Lower 
courts, however, have had great difficulty applying these precedents, 
particularly when the speech involves the Internet or other new media.
2
 For 
example, two courts of appeals from the same circuit reached different 
decisions in Internet-related student speech cases on very similar facts.
3
 
Consequently, student speech cases are among the most commonly 
litigated cases under the First Amendment, dwarfing the number of cases 
dealing with ―obscenity, indecency, incitement to or advocacy of unlawful 
activity, defamation, commercial advertising, [and] campaign finance.‖4 
Several commentators have attributed the plethora of lower court cases 
and inconsistent results to a lack of direction from the Supreme Court.
5
 
The criticism of Morse in this regard has been especially harsh.
6
 Although 
                                                                                                                     
 1. 551 U.S. 393 (2007). For a discussion of the cases, see Part I.A. 
 2. The Supreme Court cases all involved traditional media and speech that occurred under 
school supervision. See Part I.A. 
 3. Compare J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 286, 308 (3d Cir. 
2010), reh‟g en banc granted, opinion vacated, No. 08-4138, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 7342 (3d Cir. 
Apr. 9, 2010) (suspension did not violate student‘s First Amendment rights), with Layshock v. 
Hermitage Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 249, 263 (3d Cir. 2010), reh‟g en banc granted, opinion vacated, 
No. 07-4465, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 7362 (3d Cir. Apr. 9, 2010) (suspension violated student‘s 
First Amendment rights). 
 4. Frederick Schauer, Abandoning the Guidance Function: Morse v. Frederick, 2007 SUP. 
CT. REV. 205, 208. Given the reluctance of students and parents to incur the costs of litigation for 
suspensions that often are served before they can be effectively reviewed, the number of litigated 
cases vastly underestimates the number of student speech controversies. Id. at 225–26; see also 
Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1052 (2d Cir. 1979). 
 5. See, e.g., Brannon P. Denning & Molly C. Taylor, Morse v. Frederick and the Regulation 
of Student Cyberspeech, 35 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 835, 837 (2008); Benjamin F. Heidlage, Note, A 
Relational Approach to Schools‟ Regulation of Youth Online Speech, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 572, 576, 
579 (2009); Abby Marie Mollen, Comment, In Defense of the “Hazardous Freedom” of 
Controversial School Speech, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1501, 1510 (2008). 
 6. See, e.g., Denning & Taylor, supra note 5, at 837; Schauer, supra note 4, at 209–10; The 
2
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the Court‘s precedents are not unambiguous, this Article suggests that the 
difficulty in the area results primarily from lower courts‘ fundamental 
misunderstanding of the Supreme Court‘s opinions.  
Rather than critique individual lower court decisions, this Article 
presents a comprehensive approach to student speech cases applicable to 
both traditional and new media.
7
 The Article argues that student speech 
should be treated differently depending upon whether the speech occurs 
under school supervision.
8
 In particular, student speech outside school 
supervision should receive the same First Amendment protection accorded 
non-students in parallel settings. Student speech under school supervision 
may be disciplined if it is lewd, advocates illegal action, can be deemed 
school-sponsored speech, or can reasonably be predicted to cause a 
substantial disruption to the school‘s activities. Moreover, school officials‘ 
disciplinary decisions regarding on-campus student speech should be given 
great deference, particularly if not viewpoint-based.  
Part I of this Article reviews the Supreme Court‘s student speech cases 
and the general interpretation of those cases by lower courts. Part II.A 
reviews the special characteristics of the school environment that 
necessitate special First Amendment rules. Part II.B then explains why off-
campus student speech should receive full First Amendment protection, 
provides case support for that conclusion, and addresses the special cases 
of student threats and cyberbullying
9
 that arise off campus. Part II.C 
                                                                                                                     
Supreme Court, 2006 Term—Leading Cases, 121 HARV. L. REV. 181, 296 (2007). 
 7. This Article addresses student speech at public primary and secondary schools only. 
Private schools, by definition, are not government run and, therefore, are not subject to the demands 
of the First Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. I. Most undergraduate or graduate students are older, 
less impressionable, not as vulnerable, and better able to make and evaluate contributions to the 
―marketplace of ideas‖ than primary and secondary students. See Nuxoll v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist. 
No. 204, 523 F.3d 668, 674 (7th Cir. 2008); Joseph Blocher, Institutions in the Marketplace of 
Ideas, 57 DUKE L.J. 821, 877–79 (2008). Also, college students often live on campus, making 
speech outside school supervision less readily available, and are not subject to mandatory 
attendance laws. Accordingly, courts have indicated that college administrators are entitled to less 
discretion in formulating and applying restrictions on student speech than officials at primary and 
secondary schools. See, e.g., DeJohn v. Temple Univ., 537 F.3d 301, 315 (3d Cir. 2008); O‘Neal v. 
Alamo Cmty. Coll. Dist., No. SA-08-CA-1031-XR, 2010 WL 376602, at *13–14 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 
27, 2010). This is consistent with the Supreme Court‘s recognition that the constitutional rights of 
minors and adults are not the same. See, e.g., Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 129 S. 
Ct. 2633, 2639, 2640 n.1 (2009) (Fourth Amendment); Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 404–05 
(2007) (First Amendment); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568–70, 578–79 (2005) (Eighth 
Amendment). 
 8. This Article uses ―speech under school supervision‖ and ―on-campus speech‖ 
interchangeably for easier reading. Both indicate speech where the student is under the supervisory 
authority or control of the school. To be under school supervision, the student does not have to be 
literally on campus. For example, speech during school trips or school-sponsored activities is 
considered on campus. ―Speech outside school supervision‖ and ―off-campus speech‖ also are used 
interchangeably. 
 9. Cyberbullying refers to the ―‗use of the Internet, cell phones, or other technology to send 
or post text or images intended to hurt or embarrass another person.‘‖ Jessica Moy, Note, Beyond 
„The Schoolhouse Gates‟ and into the Virtual Playground: Moderating Student Cyberbullying and 
3
Goldman: Student Speech and the First Amendment: A Comprehensive Approach
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2011
398 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63 
 
describes the proper approach to on-campus student speech cases. The 
Supreme Court cases, all involving on-campus speech, necessarily control. 
While this Part does not present a unique standard for evaluating on-
campus speech, it enumerates some factors that courts should consider 
when applying that standard, guidance that is missing from most decisions 
in the area. Part II concludes with a section suggesting how to distinguish 
on-campus from off-campus student speech in cases involving new media. 
Finally, Part III illustrates application of this Article‘s approach by 
reviewing a few fact patterns of recent cases. 
I.  CASE BACKGROUND 
A.  The Supreme Court Cases 
The Supreme Court has addressed restrictions on student speech in four 
cases. The Court‘s initial foray into the area, Tinker v. Des Moines 
Independent Community School District,
10
 demonstrated a strong 
commitment to the First Amendment rights of students. Since that time, 
the Court has shown increasing deference to the choices made by school 
administrators.
11
 
In Tinker, plaintiffs sued for damages and an injunction after school 
officials disciplined them for wearing black armbands to school to protest 
the Vietnam War.
12
 The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the district 
court‘s dismissal of the complaint.13 The tone of the opinion was set by the 
Court‘s oft-quoted language that students do not ―shed their constitutional 
rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.‖14 
However, the Court recognized that school discipline involved a balance of 
interests by acknowledging the ―authority of the States and of school 
officials, consistent with fundamental constitutional safeguards, to 
prescribe and control conduct in the schools.‖15 The Court found the 
balance favored free speech in Tinker because the disciplined conduct in 
that case was closely ―akin to ‗pure speech‘‖ and there was no evidence 
                                                                                                                     
Cyberharassment After Morse v. Frederick, 37 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 565, 566 (2010) (quoting 
Janis Wolak et al., Does Online Harassment Constitute Bullying? An Exploration of Online 
Harassment by Known Peers and Online-Only Contacts, 41 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH S51, S51–52 
(2007)). Incidents involving cyber and traditional forms of bullying have garnered national 
attention. Erik Eckholm & Katie Zezima, Strategies Take Shape for Trials in Bully Case, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 16, 2010, at A19, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/16/us/16bully.html? 
ref=bullies; Lisa W. Foderaro, Private Moment Made Public, Then a Fatal Jump, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
30, 2010, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/30/nyregion/30suicide.html?_r=1 
(reporting the suicide of Rutgers University freshman Tyler Clementi after his roommate 
surreptitiously streamed footage of his intimate dorm room encounter online).  
 10. 393 U.S. 503, 506–09, 513–14 (1969). 
 11. See infra notes 25–74 and accompanying text. 
 12. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504. 
 13. Id. at 514. 
 14. Id. at 506. 
 15. Id. at 507. 
4
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that the restricted behavior materially disrupted the work of the school or 
any class or collided ―with the rights of other students to be secure and to 
be let alone.‖16 The Court also found it significant that school authorities 
did not prohibit the wearing of all controversial symbols, but rather, 
singled out the expression of one particular opinion.
17
 
Although the district court concluded that school officials had a 
reasonable fear of a disturbance, the Court emphasized that an 
―undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance‖ or ―a mere desire to 
avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an 
unpopular viewpoint‖ could not justify restrictions of otherwise protected 
student speech.
18
 The Court held that student speech is protected unless it 
―‗materially and substantially interfer[es] with the requirements of 
appropriate discipline in the operation of the school‘‖ or ―collid[es] with 
the rights of others.‖19  
Justice Hugo Black wrote an influential dissenting opinion.
20
 He found 
that there was ample evidence that the challenged armbands took students‘ 
minds off their class work and diverted them to thoughts about the 
Vietnam War.
21
 However, Justice Black‘s more fundamental objection to 
the majority‘s opinion, a position foreshadowing the views of more recent 
courts,
22
 was that the Court improperly arrogated to itself, rather than to 
elected state and school officials, the decision as to which school 
disciplinary regulations were reasonable.
23
 In Justice Black‘s view, 
students are sent to school to learn, and school discipline ―is an integral 
                                                                                                                     
 16. Id. at 508, 513–14. 
 17. Id. at 510–11. 
 18. Id. at 508–09. 
 19. Id. at 513 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)). Subsequent 
courts have not developed the second prong of Tinker‘s standard—allowing regulation of speech 
that collides with the rights of others. See Nixon v. N. Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 383 F. Supp. 
2d 965, 974 (S.D. Ohio 2005) (indicating that no court, to its knowledge, relied solely on the 
invasion of rights of others to uphold a student speech regulation); Mollen, supra note 5, at 1517–
18; Mary-Rose Papandrea, Student Speech Rights in the Digital Age, 60 FLA. L. REV. 1027, 1094 
(2008); Emily Gold Waldman, A Post-Morse Framework for Students‟ Potentially Hurtful Speech 
(Religious and Otherwise), 37 J.L. & EDUC. 463, 477 (2008). But see Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. 
Dist., 445 F.3d 1166, 1177–78, 1182–83 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding that T-shirts derogating 
homosexuals violated the rights of other students and were therefore subject to regulation by school 
administrators), vacated, 549 U.S. 1262 (2007). For a critique of Harper, see Bonnie A. Kellman, 
Note, Tinkering with Tinker: Protecting the First Amendment in Public Schools, 85 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 367, 368–384 (2009). Broad application of the ―colliding with the rights of others‖ prong 
could eliminate free speech rights at school because arguably the right of others to be let alone 
includes not being captive to unwanted speech. See, e.g., Phelps-Roper v. Strickland, 539 F.3d 356, 
362–63 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 715–18 (2000)). 
 20. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 515 (Black, J., dissenting). 
 21. Id. at 518. 
 22. See infra notes 25–74 and accompanying text. 
 23. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 517 (Black, J., dissenting). To highlight what he perceived as the 
foolishness of the Court‘s review for reasonableness, Justice Black referenced the Court‘s 
controversial and disavowed due process reasonableness review during the Lochner era. Id. at 519–
20. 
5
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and important part of training . . . children to be good citizens.‖24  
The Court‘s first step back from the broad protection accorded student 
speech in Tinker occurred in Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser.
25
 In 
Fraser, a student gave a lewd, sexually explicit nominating speech before 
an assembly of fourteen year olds.
26
 Both the district court and the court of 
appeals found that the school‘s discipline of the student violated his First 
Amendment rights as explicated in Tinker.
27
 The Supreme Court 
reversed.
28
 
The Fraser Court‘s decision was not inconsistent with Tinker. There 
was evidence of disruption from the sexually explicit speech,
29
 and unlike 
in Tinker, the discipline was not based upon the political viewpoint 
articulated but upon the manner in which the speaker‘s ideas were 
expressed.
30
  
Nonetheless, the tenor of the opinion reflected a different view about 
the relative balance between students‘ free speech rights and school 
administrators‘ need to maintain discipline in the schools. Although it 
acknowledged ―that students do not ‗shed their constitutional rights to 
freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate,‘‖31 the Court 
emphasized that the constitutional rights of minors in public schools are 
different from the rights of adults in other settings.
32
 Specifically, the Court 
identified the inculcation of fundamental values, including the teaching of 
socially appropriate behavior, as a proper function of public schools.
33
 
Perhaps more telling, the Court cited Justice Black‘s dissent in Tinker, 
disavowing a purpose ―‗to hold that the Federal Constitution 
compels . . . teachers, parents, and elected school officials to surrender 
                                                                                                                     
 24. Id. at 524. Justice Black concluded that the case was ―wholly without constitutional 
reasons . . . [and] subjects all the public schools in the country to the whims and caprices of their 
loudest-mouthed, but maybe not their brightest, students.‖ Id. at 525. Justice John Marshall Harlan, 
dissenting separately, expressed the view that school officials‘ disciplinary decisions should receive 
the greatest deference and be upheld unless the complaining party met the burden of demonstrating 
illegitimate purposes such as a desire to favor specific viewpoints. Id. at 526 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 25. 478 U.S. 675 (1986). 
 26. Id. at 677–78. ―The assembly was part of a school-sponsored educational program in self-
government.‖ Id. at 677. Students were required to attend the assembly or to report to the study hall. 
Id. 
 27. Id. at 679–80. 
 28. Id. at 680. 
 29. At the assembly, some students ―hooted and yelled‖ while others made gestures 
graphically simulating the sexual activity alluded to in the student‘s nominating speech. Id. at 678. 
One teacher also reported that she found it necessary to forego a portion of her class lesson to 
discuss the speech with the class. Id. Justice William Brennan, concurring in the judgment, 
specifically found that it was not unconstitutional for the school officials to conclude that Fraser‘s 
language was disruptive. Id. at 687–88 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 30. Id. at 680, 685 (majority opinion). 
 31. Id. at 680 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 
(1969)). 
 32. Id. at 682. 
 33. Id. at 681, 683. 
6
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control of the American public school system to public school students.‘‖34 
In Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, a high school exercised 
editorial control over a school newspaper that was produced at the school‘s 
expense as part of a journalism class.
35
 The Court distinguished Tinker as 
involving the question of whether a school needed to tolerate particular 
student speech.
36
 In contrast, the Kuhlmeier Court defined the question as 
whether the First Amendment required a school to promote affirmatively 
particular speech, here, articles chronicling students‘ experience with teen 
pregnancy and divorce.
37
 Viewing school-sponsored speech as part of the 
school curriculum,
38
 the Court held that educators could control the content 
of student speech in ―school-sponsored expressive activities[39] so long as 
the educators‘ actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical 
concerns.‖40 The Court concluded that the principal‘s decision to delete 
two pages of the school newspaper was reasonably related to such 
concerns.
41
 
As in Fraser, the tone and language of the Kuhlmeier decision were 
equally, if not more, significant than the result. Citing Fraser, the Court 
reiterated that a ―school need not tolerate student speech that is 
inconsistent with its ‗basic educational mission.‘‖42 The Court included as 
part of the school‘s mission ―‗awakening the child to cultural values‘‖ in 
addition to preparing the student for later professional training and helping 
him to adjust normally to his environment.
43
 The Court also quoted Justice 
Black‘s Tinker dissent once again, disclaiming a purpose to transfer school 
control from teachers, administrators, and elected officials to students.
44
 
The Court‘s most recent student speech case, Morse v. Frederick,45 
continued the trend toward increasing deference to the decisions of school 
administrators.
46
 In Morse, a principal disciplined a student for waving a 
banner bearing the phrase, ―BONG HiTS 4 JESUS‖ at an off-campus, 
                                                                                                                     
 34. Id. at 686 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 526 (Black, J., dissenting)). 
 35. 484 U.S. 260, 262–63 (1988). 
 36. Id. at 270–71. 
 37. Id. at 263, 270–71. 
 38. Id. at 271. 
 39. The Court included within the scope of its decision all school-sponsored publications and 
theatrical productions, not just those that were part of a specific class such as the journalism class in 
Kuhlmeier. Id. at 271–73. Ostensibly, the Court would consider bulletin board presentations as well 
as band and choir selections as school-sponsored. 
 40. Id. at 273. 
 41. Id. at 274–76. 
 42. Id. at 266 (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986)). 
 43. Id. at 272 (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1953)). To the extent the 
school‘s mission includes awakening the child to cultural values, some critical remarks by students 
might be censored as inconsistent with the cultural values of tolerance or understanding. 
 44. Id. at 271 n.4. 
 45. 551 U.S. 393 (2007). 
 46. See Erwin Chemerinsky, How Will Morse v. Frederick Be Applied?, 12 LEWIS & CLARK 
L. REV. 17, 21 (2008). 
7
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school-sponsored event.
47
 The Court began its analysis by rejecting 
Frederick‘s argument that this was not a school speech case at all.48 
Although it acknowledged some uncertainty about the applicability of 
school speech cases with both on-campus and off-campus components,
49
 
the Court stated that ―Frederick cannot stand in the midst of his fellow 
students, during school hours, at a school-sanctioned activity and claim he 
is not at school.‖50 The Court next found that although the message of 
Frederick‘s banner was cryptic, the principal‘s interpretation that the 
banner promoted illegal drug use was a reasonable one.
51
 Having come to 
that conclusion, the Court then framed the issue as ―whether a principal 
may, consistent with the First Amendment, restrict student speech at a 
school event, when that speech is reasonably viewed as promoting illegal 
drug use.‖52 In answering that question in the affirmative, Chief Justice 
John Roberts reviewed the Court‘s earlier student speech cases.53 
Chief Justice Roberts interpreted Tinker as holding that the ―‗mere 
desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany 
an unpopular viewpoint‘‖ was an insufficient justification for banning 
political speech unaccompanied by any disorder or disturbance.
54
 He said 
Fraser recognized the ―‗special characteristics of the school 
environment‘‖55 and established two principles: (1) the constitutional 
rights of students in public schools are not co-extensive with those of non-
students in other settings and (2) Tinker‘s mode of analysis was not the 
sole analytical approach in school speech cases.
56
 The Chief Justice 
construed Kuhlmeier as directed to student speech that the public might 
reasonably perceive to bear the school‘s imprimatur and therefore not 
directly relevant to the case at hand. However, he took the case as 
confirmation of the two principles he identified from Fraser.
57
  
Chief Justice Roberts next cited Fourth Amendment precedent, social 
science studies, and Congressional legislation to establish that deterring 
drug use by school children is an important, if not compelling, interest.
58
 
With that conclusion and the two principles he derived from Fraser and 
Kuhlmeier,
59
 Chief Justice Roberts easily concluded that the principal‘s on-
the-spot decision to prohibit Frederick‘s banner, which she reasonably 
                                                                                                                     
 47. Morse, 551 U.S. at 397–98. 
 48. Id. at 400. 
 49. Id. at 401 (citing Porter v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 615 n.22 (5th Cir. 
2004)). 
 50. Id. at 401 (internal quotation marks and external citation omitted). 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 403. 
 53. Id. at 403–06. 
 54. Id. at 403–04 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 
(1969)). 
 55. Id. at 405 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506). 
 56. Id. at 404–05. 
 57. Id. at 405–06. 
 58. Id. at 406–08. 
 59. Id. at 404–05. 
8
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interpreted as promoting drug use, did not violate the First Amendment.
60
 
Justice Clarence Thomas joined the majority opinion but wrote a 
separate concurrence.
61
 In his view, Tinker should be overruled because the 
First Amendment, as originally understood, provided no protection 
whatsoever to student speech in public schools.
62
  
Justice Samuel Alito wrote a separate concurrence, which Justice 
Anthony Kennedy joined.
63
 Although they both joined Chief Justice 
Roberts‘s opinion, they wanted to highlight that the decision was limited to 
allowing restrictions of speech reasonably interpreted as advocating illegal 
drug use and ―provides no support for any restriction of speech that [could] 
plausibly be interpreted as commenting on any political or social issue[.]‖64 
Specifically, Justice Alito noted that the Court‘s opinion did not endorse 
the view advocated by the United States and petitioners that school 
officials be allowed to censor any student speech that ―interferes with a 
school‘s ‗educational mission.‘‖65 Justice Alito identified the threat to the 
physical safety of students posed by drug use as the special circumstance 
that justified speech restrictions in Morse.
66
 
Justice Stephen Breyer, concurring in part and dissenting in part, found 
the First Amendment issues ―difficult‖ and ―portentous.‖67 Accordingly, he 
preferred to simply hold that the student‘s claim was barred by the 
principal‘s qualified immunity.68 
Justice John Paul Stevens, joined by Justices David Souter and Ruth 
Bader Ginsburg, dissented.
69
 The dissent acknowledged that (1) students‘ 
constitutional rights at school are not co-extensive with those of adults in 
other settings and (2) deterring drug use by school children is a ―valid and 
terribly important interest.‖70 However, the dissent believed that viewpoint 
discrimination begins with a presumption of invalidity
71
 and therefore still 
would not allow censorship of student speech unless either the prohibited 
message itself violates a permissible rule or expressly advocates conduct 
that is illegal and harmful to students.
72
 Justice Stevens found Frederick‘s 
                                                                                                                     
 60. Id. at 409–10. 
 61. Id. at 410 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 62. Id. at 410–11, 422. 
 63. Id. at 422 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 423 (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 21, Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007) 
(No. 06-278)). Such a test, he feared, would risk that some public schools would define their 
educational mission to include inculcation of whatever political and social issues were held by the 
majority. Id. at 423. 
 66. Id. at 425. 
 67. Id. at 425, 427–28 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 68. Id. at 425. 
 69. Id. at 433 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 70. Id. at 434.  
 71. Id. at 437–38. 
 72. Id. at 435. Justice Stevens acknowledged that ―while conventional speech may be 
restricted only when likely to ‗incit[e] . . . imminent lawless action,‘ it is possible that [the Court‘s] 
rigid imminence requirement ought to be relaxed at schools.‖ Id. at 439 (quoting Brandenburg v. 
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obscure message to fall far short of express advocacy
73
 and accused the 
majority of abdicating their constitutional responsibilities by giving such 
great deference to the principal‘s judgment about the meaning of 
Frederick‘s message.74 
B.  Lower Courts‟ Interpretations of the Supreme Court Cases 
One might describe Fraser and Morse as mere offshoots of Tinker‘s 
―substantial disruption‖ standard by viewing lewd speech and advocacy of 
illegal activity as disruptive to a school‘s mission to teach fundamental 
values. Under that approach, Kuhlmeier would be viewed as involving 
government, not student, speech. By providing a single standard, such an 
interpretation would remedy Justice Thomas‘s criticism in Morse that the 
Court‘s jurisprudence says ―that students have a right to speak in schools 
except when they don‘t.‖75  
While many would question whether it should be the role of schools to 
inculcate values,
76
 the Supreme Court has suggested that schools should be 
able to teach ―fundamental‖ values.77 School officials and Justices may 
disagree about what values are fundamental. However, the hypothesized 
interpretation of the Supreme Court precedent would not give school 
officials the power to define broadly their ―educational mission‖ to include 
controversial political or social views as feared by Justice Alito in Morse.
78
  
Whatever the merits of the hypothesized unified view of the Supreme 
Court case law, it is not the interpretation adopted by lower courts, and it is 
inconsistent with language in the majority opinion in Morse. Lower courts 
generally have concluded that Tinker‘s ―substantial disruption‖ standard 
remains the basic rule when analyzing student speech issues unless the 
speech is lewd, advocates drug use, or bears the school‘s imprimatur. That 
is, Fraser, Kuhlmeier, and Morse are seen as mere exceptions to Tinker‟s 
general rule.
79
 Lower courts‘ categorical approach to student speech cases 
                                                                                                                     
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969)). 
 73. Id. at 439. 
 74. Id. at 441. 
 75. Id. at 418 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 76. The real question is to what extent should schools be able to inculcate values. See 
Heidlage, supra note 5, at 589–90 & nn.111–12 (2009); Martin H. Redish & Kevin Finnerty, What 
Did You Learn in School Today? Free Speech, Values Inculcation, and the Democratic-
Educational Paradox, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 62, 63–64 (2002). Some value inculcation is inevitable, 
if only through the choice of the curriculum. Id. at 84. 
 77. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681, 683 (1986); Ambach v. Norwick, 
441 U.S. 68, 76–77 (1979); accord Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 889 (1982) (Burger, J., 
dissenting). 
 78. 551 U.S. at 423 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 79. See, e.g., J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 286, 296 (3d Cir. 
2010), reh‟g en banc granted, opinion vacated, No. 08-4138, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 7342 (3d Cir. 
Apr. 9, 2010); Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 48 (2d Cir. 2008); Ponce v. Socorro Indep. Sch. 
Dist., 508 F.3d 765, 769 (5th Cir. 2007); Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 212–13 
(3d Cir. 2001) (Alito, J.); Muller v. Jefferson Lighthouse Sch., 98 F.3d 1530, 1540 (7th Cir. 1996); 
Chandler v. McMinnville Sch. Dist., 978 F.2d 524, 529 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Denning & Taylor, 
10
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is supported by Chief Justice Roberts‘ emphasis in Morse that Fraser and 
Kuhlmeier established that Tinker was not the sole mode of analysis in 
student speech cases.
80
 
Where lower courts have erred, however, is in application of the Tinker 
standard. More recent lower courts, possibly reacting to the development 
of new media such as the Internet, cell phones, and social networking 
sites,
81
 generally have applied the ―substantial disruption‖ standard to off-
campus speech and find such speech unprotected when it reasonably may 
cause substantial disruption at the school.
82
 Moreover, lower court 
decisions, like the Supreme Court cases, do not identify how a court should 
determine whether there is a ―substantial disruption‖ beyond almost 
meaningless general statements. To find a ―substantial disruption,‖ courts, 
following Tinker, require more than an undifferentiated fear or 
apprehension of disturbance or avoidance of discomfort or 
unpleasantness.
83
 On the other hand, lower courts state that school officials 
do not have to wait until an actual disruption occurs before disciplining 
student speech.
84
 With such limited guidance, ad hoc determinations as to 
whether there is a reasonable threat of ―substantial disruption‖ necessarily 
are the rule.
85
 
As the following sections suggest, these decisions misunderstand and 
poorly apply the Court‘s jurisprudence. Student speech that does not occur 
under school supervision should receive the same First Amendment 
protection as non-student speech. Conversely, student speech that occurs 
under school supervision should be subject to a multi-factor balancing test 
with great deference given to administrators, especially when the school‘s 
discipline is not based upon the viewpoint of the speaker. 
                                                                                                                     
supra note 5, at 859–60.  
 80. See Morse, 551 U.S. at 404–05 (majority opinion). 
 81. See Heidlage, supra note 5, at 574, 580. 
 82. See, e.g., J.S. ex rel. Snyder, 593 F.3d at 298 & n.6; Doninger, 527 F.3d at 48; 
Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 38–39 (2d Cir. 2007); Evans v. Bayer, 684 F. Supp. 2d 
1365, 1374 (S.D. Fla. 2010) (finding no disruption); Mardis v. Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist., 684 F.  
Supp. 2d 1114, 1124 (E.D. Mo. 2010) (also ―true threat‖ case); Killion v. Franklin Reg‘l Sch. Dist., 
136 F. Supp. 2d 446, 455–56 (W.D. Pa. 2001) (finding no disruption). Many commentators also 
favor applying Tinker to off-campus speech. See Heidlage, supra note 5, at 585 & nn. 87–88 (citing 
sources); Emily K. Kerkhof, Note, MySpace, Yourspace, Ourspace: Student Cyberspeech, Bullying 
and Their Impact on School Discipline, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1623, 1649–50 (2009). Older courts 
were more willing to make geographical distinctions, limiting Tinker‘s application to on-campus 
speech. See, e.g., Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1050 & n.13 (2d Cir. 1979); Klein v. 
Smith, 635 F. Supp. 1440, 1441–42 (D. Me. 1986). 
 83. See, e.g., J.S. ex rel. Snyder, 593 F.3d at 298; Evans, 684 F. Supp. 2d at 1373; Mardis, 
684 F. Supp. 2d at 1123; Beussink v. Woodland R-IV Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1180 (E.D. 
Mo. 1998); Killion, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 455.  
 84. See, e.g., J.S. ex rel. Snyder, 593 F.3d at 298; Doninger, 527 F.3d at 51; Nuxoll v. Indian 
Prairie Sch. Dist. No. 204, 523 F.3d 668, 673 (7th Cir. 2008); Beussink, 30 F. Supp. 2d at 1180. 
 85. See Papandrea, supra note 19, at 1065 (―The lower courts are all over the map in the way 
in which they apply Tinker‘s requirement that the expression cause a material-and-substantial 
disruption or interfere with the rights of others.‖); accord Kerkhof, supra note 82, at 1648–49. 
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II.  A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO SCHOOL SPEECH ISSUES 
Before explaining and justifying the recommended approach to student 
speech, it is useful to discuss the unique characteristics of the public 
primary and secondary school environment that necessitate special First 
Amendment treatment of student speech issues. 
A.  Special Characteristics of the School Environment 
The school environment requires distinctive First Amendment rules if 
schools are to function properly. Schools must decide on a curriculum; 
teachers are not free to discuss whatever subject strikes their fancies. 
Teachers need to be able to discipline students for talking out of turn or 
otherwise disrupting class with speech unrelated to the day‘s lesson. 
Grades necessarily are based on the content and quality of the students‘ 
writings. Topics often must be assigned—students are not always free to 
choose their own message.  
Mandatory attendance laws also define the school environment. Such 
laws result in a student‘s forced exposure to the speech of other students. 
Avoidance of the person or turning off the medium of communication is 
not an option.
86
 Moreover, required attendance prevents parents from 
providing protection and guidance to their children during school hours 
and limits parents‘ ability to monitor and exercise control over the persons 
with whom their children associate.
87
 As a consequence, schools have a 
custodial responsibility to protect students‘ safety and can consider the 
rights of other students when defining limits on student speech.
88
 In some 
areas, such as sexual harassment, the law requires school officials to 
protect the rights of others.
89
  
 
                                                                                                                     
 86. See Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 210 (3d Cir. 2001) (Alito, J.). 
 87. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 424 (2007) (Alito, J., concurring); Jacob Tabor, 
Note, Students‟ First Amendment Rights in the Age of the Internet: Off-Campus Cyberspeech and 
School Regulation, 50 B.C. L. REV. 561, 573 n.105 (2009). 
 88. Cf. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655–56 (1995) (discussing students‘ 
rights under the Fourth Amendment). 
 89. Title IX provides that ―[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be 
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under 
any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance . . . .‖ 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) 
(2006). Schools can be liable for sexual harassment of a student on school grounds if the school  
(1) ha[s] had adequate notice that it could be held liable for the conduct at issue; 
(2) ha[s] acted with deliberate indifference to known acts of harassment;  
(3) exercise[s] substantial control over the harasser and the context where the 
known harassment occurs; and (4) . . . the harassment is so ―severe, pervasive, and 
objectively offensive‖ that it effectively bars the victim‘s access to an educational 
opportunity or benefit. 
Papandrea, supra note 19, at 1095 (quoting Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of 
Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 650 (1999)); Davis, 526 U.S. at 644–50. 
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B.  Rules for Student Speech Outside School Supervision 
1.  Rule and Justifications 
Of course, noting that the school environment requires special rules 
does not define what those rules should be. However, as discussed below, 
the unique characteristics of the school environment generally are not 
present when student speech occurs outside school supervision. 
Accordingly, this Article recommends that student speech outside school 
supervision receive full First Amendment protection
90
 and specifically 
rejects Tinker‘s ―substantial disruption‖ test, the dominant test applied by 
lower courts to off-campus student speech.
91
  
When student speech occurs outside school supervision, the speech is 
not graded, will not directly disturb the classroom
92
 or impact the 
curriculum, and does not require snap decisions by school administrators.
93
 
Other students are not required to listen to student speech outside school 
supervision. Speech outside school supervision cannot threaten schools 
with Title IX liability. Schools, by definition, have no custodial 
responsibility for students outside their supervision. While student speech 
occurring outside school supervision may threaten students under school 
supervision, such risks may be protected against under the ―true threat‖ 
doctrine.
94
  
Providing full protection of off-campus speech has the advantage of 
clarity. Clear rules generally are desirable because they provide 
predictability and reduce the need for litigation. However, the value of 
clarity in this area is particularly acute. Unclear rules risk chilling speech. 
It is for that reason that the vagueness and overbreadth doctrines have 
special application in the First Amendment context.
95
  
Equally important, unless rules are clear, school officials will have little 
incentive to protect students‘ First Amendment rights. School officials 
have a qualified immunity. They cannot be subject to a damages award 
unless their conduct violates ―‗clearly established‘ statutory or 
                                                                                                                     
 90. This Article does suggest a slight difference in the student speech context in the 
definitions of ―true threats,‖ see infra notes 124–28 and accompanying text, and possibly ―fighting 
words,‖ see infra note 149 and accompanying text.  
 91. See supra note 82 and accompanying text. 
 92. Off-campus speech, by definition, does not take place in a classroom or at a school 
activity. As such, it cannot directly interfere with a teacher‘s lesson or the school-supervised 
activity. Although off-campus speech may later create incidental disruption on campus, see, e.g., 
infra notes 100–01, 199–207 and accompanying text, such disruption is ―different in kind to a 
student standing up during a lecture and telling the teacher that . . . the teacher is a terrible teacher.‖ 
Tabor, supra note 87, at 592. There also are alternative measures to deal with speech that only 
indirectly causes a disruption. Id. at 593; see also infra notes 153–58 and accompanying text. 
 93. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 410 (2007); id. at 427 (Breyer, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part). 
 94. See infra Part II.B.3. 
 95. See United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1587 (2010). 
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constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.‖96 
To be clearly established, ―the right allegedly violated must be defined at 
the appropriate level of specificity[.]‖97 Although students still could get 
injunctive relief, few families will choose to absorb the costs of litigation 
to reverse a suspension that often has already been served.
98
 Thus, without 
clear rules, school officials will have little fear that their disciplinary 
decisions will be reversed.  
Treating speech outside of school supervision as deserving of full First 
Amendment protection has the advantage of making restrictions on speech 
under school supervision more like a time, place, and manner regulation. 
By leaving other channels for student speech open, greater restrictions on 
student speech can be justified where they are truly needed.
99
 
This is not to say that off-campus student speech does not have the 
ability to result in substantial disruption on campus. For example, posting 
on the Internet that another student is gay can cause harassment at school, 
which interferes with the learning process.
100
 Similarly, comments on 
social networking sites criticizing teachers can interfere with the student-
teacher relationship at school.
101
 Undoubtedly, such concerns have led 
lower courts to apply Tinker‘s ―substantial disruption‖ test to student 
speech wherever it occurs.
102
 
The problem with the ―substantial disruption‖ test as applied to off-
campus speech, however, is that it covers too much. A letter to the editor 
of the New York Times criticizing a school‘s choice of curriculum can 
create a substantial disturbance on campus. Such a letter may result in a 
flood of calls to administrators or even make adoption of the school‘s 
curriculum choice impossible. Similarly, the ―substantial disruption‖ test 
could allow the government to punish students for watching popular 
television shows or reading particular magazines, newspaper articles, or 
books for fear that discussion at school of such normally protected speech 
will disrupt classes or interfere with the fundamental values that the school 
seeks to teach.
103
 It is not even clear that truthful speech accusing a teacher 
                                                                                                                     
 96. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (finding that it is not enough that the 
government actor‘s conduct is ultimately found unlawful).  
 97. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 615 (1999). 
 98. See Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1052 (2d Cir. 1979). 
 99. Id.; accord Killion v. Franklin Reg‘l Sch. Dist., 136 F. Supp. 2d 446, 457 (W.D. Pa. 
2001). 
 100. See Nuxoll v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist. No. 204, 523 F.3d 668, 674 (7th Cir. 2008). Judge 
Richard Posner opined that if a student‘s negative comments about homosexuality ―will lead to a 
decline in students‘ test scores, upsurge in truancy, or other symptoms of a sick school,‖ it may be 
prohibited under Tinker. Id. 
 101. See J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 286, 293 (3d Cir. 2010), 
reh‟g en banc granted, opinion vacated, No. 08-4138, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 7342 (3d. Cir. Apr. 
9, 2010). 
 102. See Papandrea, supra note 19, at 1056 (―[M]ost courts . . . have suggested that they might 
be willing to apply Tinker in any student expression case, even if the student speech is plainly off 
campus, as long as the speech causes a substantial disruption at the school.‖). 
 103. See id. at 1093. 
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of sexual harassment or school officials of providing answers to 
standardized tests would be protected under the ―substantial disruption‖ 
test.
104
  
Application of Tinker to off-campus speech also risks extension of 
Fraser and Morse to student speech outside school supervision. Although 
that risk has not yet come to fruition in reported cases,
105
 the prospect of 
schools policing sexual innuendo in student homes is more than a little 
troubling and may inhibit a variety of student expression. Conversely, the 
fear that on-campus precedents would be applied to off-campus speech 
may cause courts to give less deference than is desirable to school officials 
in cases of on-campus speech restrictions.
106
 This may handcuff courts 
from properly dealing with the worst cases of abuse—the types that cause 
students to stay home from or change schools.
107
  
Moreover, adoption of the Tinker test for speech outside school 
supervision is not necessary to protect against the most troubling problems 
created by student speech. Speech that a reasonable person would interpret 
as a threat to student or teacher safety may be disciplined under the ―true 
threat‖ doctrine.108 Fighting words or obscenity also may be challenged 
under the First Amendment principles applicable to non-students.
109
 Off-
campus comments that result in on-campus harassment or disruption may 
not be punished, but the persons engaging in the harassment or disruption 
on campus may be disciplined. Where a student while off campus 
advocates punishable behavior that causes a material disruption on 
campus, he may be disciplined as a co-conspirator. Of course, students 
injured by off-campus speech still have recourse to the offending student‘s 
parents, the police, and tort law.
110
 
 
 
                                                                                                                     
 104. While no court to date has abused the ―substantial disruption‖ test to the extent 
hypothesized in the text, reliance on judicial discretion to sensibly apply such an amorphous test 
would risk chilling protected expression and devalue all First Amendment speech rights. 
 105. See id. at 1069–70. Given the cost of litigation and the generally short duration of most 
sanctions, many cases of school discipline are not challenged, much less reported. See Thomas v. 
Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1052 (2d Cir. 1979); Schauer, supra note 4, at 225–26. Accordingly, 
schools may already be applying Fraser and Morse to student speech outside school supervision. 
 106. Thomas, 607 F.2d at 1044–45 (―[O]ur willingness to defer to the schoolmaster‘s expertise 
in administering school discipline rests, in large measure, upon the supposition that the arm of 
authority does not reach beyond the schoolhouse gate.‖). 
 107. See Kerkhof, supra note 82, at 1650 n.233 (citing Susan Hanley Kosse & Robert H. 
Wright, How Best to Confront the Bully: Should Title IX or Anti-Bullying Statutes Be the Answer?, 
12 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL‘Y 53, 55 (2005)). 
 108. See infra Part II.B.3. 
 109. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942) (―fighting words‖); 
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 36 (1973) (obscenity). 
 110. See Denning & Taylor, supra note 5, at 883–84 & n.263; Papandrea, supra note 19, at 
1100–01. 
15
Goldman: Student Speech and the First Amendment: A Comprehensive Approach
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2011
410 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63 
 
2.  Supreme Court Support for Full First Amendment for Student 
Speech Outside School Supervision 
Although the Supreme Court has never heard a case in which a student 
was disciplined for speech outside school supervision, the dichotomy this 
Article suggests finds strong support in Supreme Court opinions.  
The Court has repeatedly indicated that off-campus speech receives 
greater protection than on-campus speech. In Morse, the Court declared, 
―Had Fraser delivered the same speech in a public forum outside the school 
context, it would have been protected.‖111 Similarly, in Kuhlmeier, the 
Court stated, ―A school need not tolerate student speech that is inconsistent 
with its ‗basic educational mission,‘ even though the government could not 
censor similar speech outside the school.‖112 
However, the strongest endorsement of full First Amendment 
protection for student speech outside school supervision derives from the 
analytical approach of the majority in Morse. Before addressing the First 
Amendment rules applicable to student speech, the Court rejected the 
defendant‘s argument that the case was not a school speech case at all.113 
To conclude the case was indeed a school speech case, the Court relied 
upon the facts that (1) the event occurred during school hours and was an 
approved event or class trip and (2) teachers and administrators were 
interspersed among students whom they were charged with supervising.
114
 
The clear implication was that if the student speech did not occur under 
school supervision, Morse would not be a student speech case, and normal 
First Amendment protections would apply. 
The apparent basis for lower courts‘ applications of Tinker‘s 
―substantial disruption‖ standard to off-campus speech appears to be the 
language in Tinker:  
―[C]onduct by the student, in class or out of it, which for any 
reason—whether it stems from time, place, or type of 
behavior—materially disrupts classwork or involves 
substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others is, of 
course, not immunized by the constitutional guarantee of 
freedom of speech.‖115  
                                                                                                                     
 111. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 405 (2007); see also id. at 434 (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(―I take the Court‘s point that the message on Frederick‘s banner is not necessarily protected 
speech, even though it unquestionably would have been had the banner been unfurled elsewhere.‖); 
Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 688 (1986) (Brennan, J., concurring) (―If 
respondent had given the same speech outside of the school environment, he could not have been 
penalized . . . .‖). 
 112. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988) (internal citation omitted) 
(quoting Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685). 
 113. Morse, 551 U.S. at 400–01 (majority opinion). 
 114. Id. 
 115. J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 286, 313 n.15 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(Chagares, J., concurring in part) (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 
503, 513 (1969)), reh‟g en banc granted, opinion vacated, No. 08-4138, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 
16
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However, immediately prior to the quoted language, the Tinker Court said,  
A student‘s rights, therefore, do not embrace merely the 
classroom hours. When he is in the cafeteria, or on the 
playing field, or on the campus during the authorized hours, 
he may express his opinions, even on controversial 
subjects[,] . . . if he does so without ―materially and 
substantially interfer[ing] with the requirements of 
appropriate discipline in the operation of the school‖ and 
without colliding with the rights of others.
116
  
Thus, when placed in context, the highlighted language was not meant to 
indicate that speech outside school supervision was subject to Tinker‘s 
standard, but rather to ensure that speech on campus, but outside the 
classroom, was subject to regulation under Tinker.
117
 
3.  True Threats 
Given the modern rash of violent crimes in school settings,
118
 one might 
fear that schools would not be able to protect adequately students if they 
could not consider Columbine-type threats made outside of school 
supervision when disciplining students. However, this fear is unjustified. 
Subjecting student speech outside school supervision to non-student First 
Amendment principles does not immunize student speech. In particular, 
the Supreme Court has long recognized that the Constitution permits 
government to proscribe ―true threats.‖119 
A statement constitutes a ―true threat‖ if it would communicate to a 
reasonable person a serious intent to cause a present or future harm.
120
 
―The speaker need not actually intend to carry out the threat. Rather, a 
prohibition on true threats ‗protect[s] individuals from the fear of violence‘ 
and ‗from the disruption that fear engenders,‘ in addition to protecting 
people ‗from the possibility that the threatened violence will occur.‘‖121 
Nonetheless, speech is not a true threat merely because it is ―vituperative, 
abusive, and inexact.‖122 For example, in Watts v. United States, the 
                                                                                                                     
7342 (3d Cir. Apr. 9, 2010).  
 116. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512–13 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 
1966)). 
 117. J.S. ex rel. Snyder, 593 F.3d at 313 n.15. The case cited by Tinker after the ―in class or 
out of it‖ language, Blackwell v. Issaquena County Board of Education, 363 F.2d 749, 753 (5th Cir. 
1966), also involved on-campus speech. 
 118. See Time Line of Worldwide School Shootings, INFOPLEASE, http://www.infoplease.com/  
ipa/A0777958.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2011). 
 119. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 360 (2003); Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 
708 (1969) (per curiam). 
 120. See Black, 538 U.S. at 360; Mardis v. Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist., 684 F. Supp. 2d 1114, 
1118 (E.D. Mo. 2010); O‘Neal v. Alamo Cmty. Coll. Dist., No. SA-08-CA-1031-XR, 2010 WL 
376602, at *12 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 27, 2010). 
 121. Black, 538 U.S. at 359–60 (quoting R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992)). 
 122. Watts, 394 U.S. at 708. 
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defendant was prosecuted under a statute making it illegal to threaten the 
life of the President of the United States.
123
 The Supreme Court reversed 
the defendant‘s conviction and found that the defendant‘s statements that 
he would refuse induction into the armed forces and if they ever made him 
carry a rifle, the first man he would want to get in his sights was L.B.J., 
were mere hyperbole and not a true threat against the life of the 
President.
124
 
While courts, such as the Court in Watts, may be reluctant to find a 
―true threat‖ outside the school context, they appear much more willing to 
give great deference to primary and secondary school administrators 
imposing discipline when the school officials find a true threat.
125
 There 
are sound reasons for the difference. First, the true threat cases outside the 
school context generally have involved criminal prosecutions.
126
 In 
criminal cases, the consequences of finding the defendant‘s speech 
unprotected are significantly greater than in school discipline cases, and 
the prosecutor needs to establish her case ―beyond a reasonable doubt.‖ 
Second, courts are aware of the epidemic of school violence and are 
sensitive to the risks schools would face if they failed to act when 
confronted with student threats.
127
 Finally, ―the heightened vulnerability 
of students arising from the lack of parental protection and the close 
proximity of students with one another makes schools places of ‗special 
danger‘ to the physical safety of the student.‖ 128 As a result, the majority, 
if not all, of the judges in Morse opined that they would be more willing 
to defer to school administrators where student safety was involved than 
they would to decisionmakers outside the school context.
129
 Thus, under 
the proposed approach to off-campus student speech, school officials, 
through the ―true threat‖ doctrine, would still be able to rely on speech 
outside their supervision to suspend students who the officials reasonably 
perceive as posing a physical threat to other students.
130
 
                                                                                                                     
 123. Id. at 705. 
 124. Id. at 706, 708 (referring to then-President Lyndon Baines Johnson). 
 125. See, e.g., Ponce v. Socorro Indep. Sch. Dist., 508 F.3d 765, 771–72 (5th Cir. 2007); 
Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 2007); Doe v. Pulaski Cnty. Special Sch. 
Dist., 306 F.3d 616, 626–27 (8th Cir. 2002); see also O‟Neal, 2010 WL 376602, at *13–14 (finding 
that college officials are subject to the ―true threat‖ standard of Watts rather than the lesser standard 
applicable to primary and secondary school officials). 
 126. J.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 856 (Pa. 2002). Of course, the major 
Supreme Court ―true threat‖ cases involved criminal prosecutions. See Black, 538 U.S. at 348–49; 
R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 379–81; Watts, 394 U.S. at 706–08. 
 127. See, e.g., Ponce, 508 F.3d at 771–72; Boim v. Fulton Cnty. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 978, 
983–84 (11th Cir. 2007). 
 128. Ponce, 508 F.3d at 770 (quoting Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 424 (2007) (Alito, J., 
concurring)). 
 129. See Morse, 551 U.S. at 409–10 (majority opinion); id. at 424–25 (Alito, J., concurring); 
id. at 439 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
 130. Discipline needs to be timely. Absent further incidents, allowing a student to attend 
classes for extended periods following the challenged speech should negate a school official‘s claim 
that she perceived a true threat. Cf. Porter v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 615 (5th Cir. 
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4.  The Special Case of Cyberbullying 
Commentators who recommend that school officials should have broad 
power to discipline speech outside school supervision generally are 
motivated by a desire to combat cyberbullying.
131
 Undoubtedly, 
cyberbullying has become a significant problem and presents unique First 
Amendment issues. It is not easy to balance the respective interests of the 
alleged bully, her victim, the school, and society. However, in no event 
should the appropriate remedy be a school official unilaterally assuming 
the power to discipline speech occurring outside her supervision. 
There is little question that cyberbullying is on the increase and can 
cause substantial damage to troubled teens.
132
 A 2010 study by the 
Cyberbullying Research Center found that one in five middle school 
students were affected by ―willful and repeated harm‖ inflicted through 
phones and computers.
133
 According to the Federal Probation Juvenile 
Department, ―‗[ninety] percent of middle-school students have had their 
feelings hurt online‘ . . . .‖134 Victims of bullying experience a variety of 
psychological harms that, in extreme cases, may lead to suicide.
135
 
Although it is natural to want to avoid the damage cyberbullying can 
cause, there are reasons to be reluctant to regulate such student 
communications outside school supervision. Verbal bullying occurred long 
before computers and text messaging were invented. Moreover, given the 
closed environment in which children grew up, derogatory statements 
about a student quickly circulated throughout the neighborhood. Yet, such 
name-calling outside of school has never been subject to school regulation. 
Rather, it is standard First Amendment doctrine that speech that does not 
invade the privacy of others should not be restricted just because some may 
find the speech offensive.
136
 While there might be little harm in eliminating 
                                                                                                                     
2004) (noting that the student attended school without incident for two years before threatening 
drawing surfaced). 
 131. See, e.g., Kerkhof, supra note 82, at 1650–51; Renee L. Servance, Comment, 
Cyberbullying, Cyber-harassment, and the Conflict Between Schools and the First Amendment, 
2003 WIS. L. REV. 1213, 1238–39; Tabor, supra note 87, at 562–63. 
 132. See, e.g., Cyberbullying, STOP BULLYING NOW!, http://www.stopbullyingnow.hrsa.gov/adults/cy  
ber-bullying.aspx (last visited Jan. 24, 2011); Posting of Tara Parker-Pope to N.Y. Times Well 
Blog, More Teens Victimized by Cyber-Bullies, http://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/11/27/more-
teens-victimized-by-cyber-bullies/ (Nov. 27, 2007, 13:51 EST).   
 133. Jan Hoffman, Online Bullies Pull Schools into the Fray, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2010, at 
A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/28/style/28bully.html.  
 134. Moy, supra note 9, at 566 (quoting Alvin W. Cohn, Juvenile Focus, 71 FED. PROBATION 
44, 50 (2007)). 
 135. Servance, supra note 131, at 1216–17; Christopher Maag, When the Bullies Turned 
Faceless, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2007, at ST9, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/16/fash 
ion/16meangirls.html. 
 136. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 409 (2007) (―After all, much political and religious 
speech might be perceived as offensive to some.‖); see also Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21–
22 (1971). Of course, if speech is so offensive as to provoke imminent unlawful action, it may be 
regulated under the ―fighting words‖ doctrine. See id. at 20; Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 
U.S. 568, 573 (1942).  
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a student‘s ability to call a fellow student ―a stupid, fat whore,‖ not all 
cases of what may be considered cyberbullying have such little social 
value. Regulation of cyberbullying also may silence religious or political 
views. For example, a student might be disciplined for expressing the 
opinion that homosexuality is immoral on another student‘s Facebook 
page. A truthful statement posted on the Internet claiming that a candidate 
running for class president cheated on an exam and then lied about it could 
result in discipline. In one case, an honor student was disciplined for 
posting on Facebook, ―‗To those select students who have had the 
displeasure of having Ms. Sarah Phelps [a teacher], or simply knowing her 
and her insane antics: Here is the place to express your feelings of 
hatred‘ . . . .‖137 Whether or not one views this as a political comment 
about government workers, silencing such speech undermines the First 
Amendment value in self-expression said to be necessary to the 
autonomous self
138
 and undercuts school teachings about the value of First 
Amendment freedoms.
139
 Additionally, silencing such speech may lead 
students to act out their complaints in more violent ways. Finally, 
regulating cyberbullying increases the likelihood that schools will be able 
to monitor students‘ phone messages, mall conversations, and discussions 
with friends. That prospect will inevitably result in chilling student speech 
and raises the ugly head of a totalitarian state. 
On the other hand, a strong case can be made for some regulation of 
cyberbullying. First, as suggested above, cyberbullying can cause 
significant harm. Cyberbullying, as any form of bullying, can result in a 
wide range of psychological harm. Victims of bullying may suffer low self-
esteem, anxiety, depression, or social withdrawal.
140
 Increased difficulty 
concentrating, stress, or truancy may compromise the student‘s 
education.
141
 Medical journals also report that kids who are tormented 
online are more likely to get detention or be suspended.
142
 Some victims of 
bullying may eventually strike back with violence toward the bully or 
innocent bystanders.
143
 In any event, ―studies show serious long-term 
effects into adulthood such as depression, negative self-concept, and 
suicide.‖144 Second, the maturity levels of students make them particularly 
                                                                                                                     
 137. Carmen Gentile, Student Fights Record of „Cyberbullying,‟ N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2009, at 
A20, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/08/us/08cyberbully.html.  
 138. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 427 (1974) (Marshall, J., concurring); C. Edwin 
Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 964, 994 (1978); 
Chemerinsky, supra note 46, at 23. 
 139. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Teaching that Speech Matters: A Framework for Analyzing 
Speech Issues in Schools, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 825, 826 (2009). 
 140. Servance, supra note 131, at 1216. 
 141. Nuxoll v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist. No. 204, 523 F.3d 668, 671, 674 (7th Cir. 2008); 
Parker-Pope, supra note 132. 
 142. Parker-Pope, supra note 132. 
 143. Severance, supra note 131, at 1216–17. 
 144. Id. (citing Sandra Graham & Jaana Juvonen, Self-Blame and Peer Victimization in Middle 
School: An Attributional Analysis, 34 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 587, 587 (1998); Ken Rigby, 
Health Consequences of Bullying and Its Prevention in Schools, in PEER HARASSMENT IN SCHOOL: 
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susceptible to the harms from bullying.
145
 The Supreme Court has 
recognized that minors‘ immaturity should be taken into account when 
shaping First Amendment protection in the context of indecent speech.
146
 
The government‘s interest in protecting minors from psychologically 
damaging speech seems at least as strong as its interest in shielding 
youngsters from sexual expression.
147
 Just as the Court has suggested that 
the requirement for a true threat may be reduced in the school context,
148
 
the vulnerability of students may justify lowering the threshold for finding 
speech to constitute ―fighting words.‖149 Third, the ―marketplace of ideas‖ 
metaphor for First Amendment protection has limited force in the context 
of cyberbullying. Although, as suggested above, regulating cyberbullying 
may chill some beneficial speech, the reality is that most disciplined 
speech will have little social value. Moreover, in the cyberbullying context, 
the marketplace metaphor suffers from a market failure.
150
 There is no 
adequate response to false ideas when psychological damage has already 
been done to vulnerable minors. Finally, cyberbullying can be 
distinguished from the verbal abuse experienced face-to-face. With the use 
of technology, derogatory statements may be transmitted widely and 
instantaneously from anywhere. More important, the statements are 
written. While verbal abuse can cause the same harm as cyberbullying, 
policing such abuse is impractical because the bully and victim often will 
tell different stories. Where the harassment is written, there are not the 
same proof problems.
151
 
Nonetheless, even if cyberbullying is a major problem that needs to be 
addressed, the remedy should not be a school official assuming the power 
to discipline off-campus speech. Punishment, in the first instance, should 
be left to parents. The Supreme Court has indicated that the parental right 
is a fundamental one under the Fourteenth Amendment.
152
 It should not be 
interfered with absent special circumstances.
153
 Parents know their children 
                                                                                                                     
THE PLIGHT OF THE VULNERABLE AND VICTIMIZED 310, 322–23 (Jaana Juvonen & Sandra Graham 
eds., 2001)). 
 145. One commentator has suggested that the special vulnerability of students justifies 
regulating off-campus cyberspeech harassing students but not speech directed toward teachers or 
school officials. See Tabor, supra note 87, at 599–603. 
 146. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 749 (1978); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 
629, 638–39 (1968). 
 147. See Tabor, supra note 87, at 600. 
 148. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 409–10; id. at 424–25 (Alito, J., concurring); id. at 
439 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 149. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942). 
 150. See Blocher, supra note 7, at 829–30, 834–35. 
 151. However, there still may be an issue as to who sent the problematic communication. See 
Hoffman, supra note 133 (reporting how principal concluded that harassing text messages were not 
sent by the owner of the phone). 
 152. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65–66 (2000); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 
399 (1923). 
 153. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 80 (Thomas, J., concurring); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 
213–14 (1972). 
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better than anyone and have the greatest ability and interest in teaching 
appropriate behavior. In the case of conflicting lessons, parents should be 
able to determine which interest should prevail when their child is under 
their supervision. For example, assume that Bill has been using the Internet 
to harass Jane, who has been too embarrassed by the messages to notify 
anyone. After repeated disturbing messages, Jane finally responds with an 
e-mail, ―You are a stupid jerk, and I and everyone else hates you.‖ 
Application of a school‘s no tolerance for cyberbullying policy would 
result in Jane‘s discipline. Jane‘s parents, however, may be more 
sympathetic to Jane‘s injury and want to provide a different message. 
While not condoning her method of expression, Jane‘s parents may want to 
provide positive feedback for the normally shy Jane‘s standing up for 
herself. In cases where parents fail to act or there is more systematic or 
severe harassment, recourse may be made to tort and criminal laws.
154
 The 
higher burden of proof required by such laws reduces the risk of chilling 
protected speech. Tort and criminal laws do impose litigation costs. 
However, such costs may have beneficial effects. Students and their 
parents will have little incentive to challenge questionable conduct that 
does little more than cause minor hurt feelings. School officials, however, 
would not be immune from such complaints. Trying to resolve all cases of 
hurt feelings, whether generated on or off campus, would open up a 
Pandora‘s box of problems for school administrators. Conversely, the 
penalties available through the judicial system more effectively can deter 
the more serious instances of cyberbullying. Leaving discipline to parents 
and the judicial process also has the advantage of keeping schools 
institutions of learning as opposed to penal institutions. If schools start 
policing and punishing off-campus speech, students‘ views of schools, 
teachers, and administrators may be altered in a manner that interferes with 
the learning process itself. 
This is not to suggest that the school should have no role in remedying 
cyberbullying. On the contrary, there are several approaches that some 
schools have adopted that should have wider application. For example, 
some high schools have achieved great results through the ―Names‖ 
program, which the Anti-Defamation League sponsors and supervises. 
―Guided by teachers, trained student volunteers and league facilitators, 
students talk with the unflinching candor of children about topics most 
adults would prefer to avoid: gossip, rumor, physical harassment, racism, 
homophobia, depression, eating disorders, self-mutilation, drinking, drugs, 
suicide—the full range of bullying behavior and its consequences.‖155 
Although the ―Names‖ program requires two months of training by 
                                                                                                                     
 154. See Denning & Taylor, supra note 5, at 883–84 & n.263; Papandrea, supra note 19, at 
1100. But see Todd D. Erb, Comment, A Case for Strengthening School District Jurisdiction to 
Punish Off-Campus Incidents of Cyberbullying, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 257, 275–80 (2008) (detailing 
practical problems with pursuing criminal or civil remedies). 
 155. Gerri Hirshey, Pushing Back at Bullying, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2007, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/28/nyregion/nyregionspecial2/28rbully.html?pagewanted=1&_r  
=1. 
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students and staff, ―[a] follow-up survey of the ‗Names‘ program in San 
Diego in 2000 found that 60 percent of students said that after the session 
they would be less likely to call someone a name; nearly half reported 
positive changes in other students‘ behavior.‖156 Of course, even without 
the power to discipline, school officials can talk to the alleged offender and 
explain the harm he is causing. In more serious cases of harassment, 
administrators can refer complaints to the police.
157
 Administrators also 
can monitor the offender‘s behavior at school.158 The worst cyberbullies 
are likely to engage in bullying tactics there too. Those behaviors could and 
should be subject to discipline. Guidance counselors can meet with and 
assist the victims of bullying. Schools can educate parents about the 
possible harms of digital media and encourage them to more closely 
supervise their children‘s digital speech activities.159 Schools, through 
Parent Teacher Associations, might organize ―parents‘ counsels‖ that are 
charged with investigating allegations of cyberbullying. Where wrongdoing 
is found, the counsel or a school administrator can publicize the name of 
the wrongdoer, notify his parents, and correct any false claims that may 
have been made. What school officials should not do, however, is 
independently discipline student speech outside their supervision. Even if 
one concluded that schools should and constitutionally could discipline 
off-campus cyberbullying, authorization should come from state 
legislatures, rather than having non-elected administrators unilaterally 
assume that power. Thus, neither cyberbullying nor threats of violence 
justify extending school authority to student speech outside their 
supervision. 
C.  Rule for Student Speech Occurring Under School Supervision 
1.  General Approach  
When student speech occurs under school supervision, the Supreme 
Court‘s student speech cases control.160 Unless speech is lewd, advocates 
drug use, or bears the school‘s imprimatur, lower courts generally have 
concluded that Tinker‘s ―substantial disruption‖ standard remains the basic 
test for analyzing on-campus student speech issues.
161
 The difficulty is 
determining what speech under school supervision satisfies the Tinker 
standard.
162
 This section presents an approach to that problem. 
                                                                                                                     
 156. Id. Cyberbullying education also has had international success. A study conducted in 
Norway ―found that the incidence of bullying in Norwegian schools fell by [fifty] percent or more 
in the two years after an anti-bullying campaign; truancy, theft and vandalism also dropped 
markedly.‖ Id. 
 157. The police have greater investigative resources than school administrators, and the mere 
police involvement should act as a deterrent to further cyberharassment. 
 158. See Hoffman, supra note 133. 
 159. See Papandrea, supra note 19, at 1100. 
 160. See supra notes 25–74 and accompanying text. 
 161. See sources cited supra note 79. 
 162. See Kerkhof, supra note 82, at 1648–49. 
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There is little question that students‘ constitutional rights at school must 
be restricted for schools to properly function.
163
 The Supreme Court also 
has recognized the practical need to give school officials‘ disciplinary 
decisions substantial deference if federal courts are not to usurp the 
authority of school boards and administrators.
164
 Given this deference to 
school administrators, the need to restrict student rights and the difficulty 
in determining what constitutes a substantial disruption, it might seem 
more efficient, as Justice Thomas suggests, to disavow any review of 
school administrators‘ disciplinary decisions.165 After all, few cases are 
likely to be reversed; yet the number of cases brought and the costs of 
pursuing litigation are huge. Such an approach, what Professors Martin 
Redish and Kevin Finnerty call the ―civic republican‖ model of value 
inculcation,
166
 although tempting, is untenable. For example, a school 
board could prohibit any statement in support of the Republican Party or 
Republican candidates. In short, the government could indoctrinate youth 
to its desired views and create a totalitarian state.
167
 As Judge Richard 
Posner has stated, 
The murderous fanaticism displayed by young German 
soldiers in World War II, alumni of the Hitler Jugend, 
illustrates the danger of allowing government to control the 
access of children to information and opinion. Now that 
eighteen-year-olds have the right to vote, it is obvious that 
they must be allowed the freedom to form their political views 
on the basis of uncensored speech before they turn eighteen, 
so that their minds are not a blank when they first exercise the 
franchise. . . . People are unlikely to become well-functioning, 
independent-minded adults and responsible citizens if they are 
raised in an intellectual bubble.
168
 
With the threat of totalitarianism in the absence of any First 
Amendment rights and the operational needs of the schools to significantly 
restrict First Amendment rights, the ―substantial disruption‖ test 
necessarily requires a balance of the school‘s, the students‘, and the 
public‘s respective interests. Unfortunately, courts have not adequately 
identified how the proper balance should be achieved. To remedy that 
problem, this Article enumerates a number of factors that administrators 
                                                                                                                     
 163. See supra Part II.A.  
 164. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 409–10 (2007); id. at 421 (Thomas, J., 
concurring); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 267, 273 (1988); see also Tinker v. 
Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 525–26 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting). 
 165. See Morse, 551 U.S. at 410–11 (Thomas, J., concurring) (rejecting First Amendment 
protection for student speech based upon his understanding of the original meaning of the 
Constitution). 
 166. Redish & Finnerty, supra note 76, at 85–86, 96. 
 167. Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 877 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring); Tinker, 393 
U.S. at 511; Redish & Finnerty, supra note 76, at 78–83. 
 168. Am. Amusement Mach. Ass‘n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 576–77 (7th Cir. 2001).  
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and judges should consider when determining whether on-campus student 
speech should be deemed to create a substantial disruption under Tinker. 
Administrators‘ evaluation of the recommended factors should be given 
great deference, particularly when the school discipline is not viewpoint-
based. If, as suggested in this Article, students‘ off-campus speech carries 
full First Amendment rights,
169students in today‘s technological age 
generally will have ample avenues of communication available to them off 
campus to adequately express their ideas and feelings.  
2.  Factors to Consider When Determining Whether Tinker‘s 
―Substantial Disruption‖ Standard Has Been Met 
a.  Curricular Matters 
When evaluating a school‘s interest, the initial inquiry is whether the 
speech is related to curricular matters. Schools necessarily make content-
based restrictions when deciding on curriculum and choosing and 
evaluating assignments. They must be permitted to do so if schools are to 
function properly. As Professor Mark Cordes has said, ―Schools exist for 
educational, and not speech purposes, and therefore legitimate curricular 
and educational concerns should necessarily trump student speech 
interests.‖170 
The Supreme Court has recognized that schools have a role in 
inculcating fundamental values.
171
 Thus, restrictions on the manner of 
student speech designed to teach civility also might be given great 
deference. Although what constitutes a fundamental value is subject to 
debate, restrictions silencing discussion on controversial issues, such as 
abortion or the war in Iraq, would be the most problematic. Nonetheless, 
courts should be reluctant to overly rely on a school‘s ability to teach 
fundamental values when analyzing student speech cases. Often, so-called 
―fundamental values‖ can conflict, particularly if one acknowledges that 
the right to free speech is a fundamental one. If a student wears a T-shirt 
that reads, ―Homosexuality is shameful,‖172 does discipline further the 
fundamental values of civility and tolerance or violate the fundamental 
values in diversity of opinions and free religious expression?
173
 
 
                                                                                                                     
 169. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 170. Mark W. Cordes, Making Sense of High School Speech After Morse v. Frederick, 17 WM. 
& MARY BILL RTS. J. 657, 688 (2009); see also Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 
267, 271 (1988). 
 171. See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986); Ambach v. Norwick, 
441 U.S. 68, 76–77 (1979). 
 172. See Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166, 1171 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated, 
549 U.S. 1262 (2007). 
173. One also can question whether schools should instill fundamental values or merely teach 
them. That is, while it is clear the school can and should teach (and can test) that it is important to 
be civil to others, it is less clear that they should be able to silence a contrary view or punish a 
student for not adopting those teachings in his everyday life. 
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b.  Location of Speech 
Related to whether speech affects curricular matters is the location 
where the speech occurs. Speech that takes place in the classroom or 
during an assembly more clearly threatens a disruption than speech uttered 
in the halls or the cafeteria. This is not to suggest, however, that speech 
that occurs in a classroom necessarily is disruptive. Obviously, a proper 
student response to a teacher‘s query causes no disruption. Even 
unauthorized speech in the classroom may not cause any harm. For 
example, if a student posts something on his website during class while he 
waits for his fellow students to finish an assignment that he has completed, 
there has been no substantial disruption from the act of posting.  
c.  Type of Restriction—Discriminatory or Neutral? 
A critical question when evaluating a student‘s and the public‘s interest 
is where on the viewpoint-/content-neutrality spectrum the school‘s 
regulation lies. Viewpoint discrimination is the most suspect under the 
First Amendment.
174
 ―It is fundamental that the First Amendment ‗was 
fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about 
of political and social changes desired by the people.‘‖175 Yet, government 
regulation based on viewpoint is an anathema to positive change and 
maximizes the risk of creating a totalitarian state. Quite simply, ideological 
discipline is not a proper undertaking for school authorities.
176
Accordingly, 
a school official‘s viewpoint-based discipline of student speech should 
receive the least deference, and courts should be least willing to find that 
the student speech was likely to cause a substantial disruption. Content-
based restrictions, although not as egregious as viewpoint-based 
regulations, also normally are presumptively invalid.
177
 One reason is that, 
in some circumstances, content-based restrictions, by preserving the status 
quo, act as de facto viewpoint discrimination. For example, a rule 
prohibiting discussion of the United States‘ involvement in the war in Iraq 
                                                                                                                     
 174. See Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995) (―The 
government must abstain from regulating speech when the specific motivating ideology or the 
opinion or perspective of the speaker is the rationale for the restriction.‖ (citing Perry Educ. Ass‘n 
v. Perry Local Educators‘ Ass‘n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983))); accord Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 
393, 436 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting). When curricular assignments designate a particular 
viewpoint, the presumption should be that the assignment is for legitimate pedagogical purposes 
and not motivated by a desire to regulate the opinion or perspective of the student. Cf. Kuhlmeier, 
484 U.S. at 273 (―[E]ducators do not offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial control 
over the style and content of student speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as 
their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.‖). 
 175. Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 548 (2001) (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. 
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964)). 
 176. See W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943). 
 177. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 828; see also United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1584 
(2010); Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 573 (2002); Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the 
N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 116 (1991). Content-based restrictions concerning 
curricular matters, however, are necessary for effective operation of schools and cannot be 
considered presumptively invalid. 
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silences dissent as effectively as a regulation regulating only speech 
contrary to the war effort. Thus, a court should give limited deference to 
school officials‘ content-based discipline of student speech, at least outside 
curricular matters. Finally, content-neutral regulation on student speech 
raises the fewest First Amendment concerns. Accordingly, an 
administrator‘s content-neutral discipline of student speech should be 
given the most deference and courts should be most willing to uphold a 
finding that the student‘s speech would result in a substantial disruption. 
d.  Effect on Political Institutions 
Also relevant to the public‘s interest is the extent to which school 
regulations undermine political institutions. This corresponds to the 
greatest fear of restriction on student speech—the creation of a totalitarian 
state. Thus, a school‘s prohibition of speech endorsing a particular 
candidate for office is much more problematic than restrictions on a 
student‘s ability to make gratuitous derogatory comments about fellow 
students. This is not to suggest that only political speech deserves First 
Amendment protection. The First Amendment also protects the 
individual‘s right to self-expression, which is an essential aspect of 
personhood and autonomy.
178
 Rather, it is a frank recognition that to the 
extent that one is balancing interests, distinctions can be made between the 
values of certain types of speech.
179
 While valuing speech may be 
inconsistent with First Amendment theory, the Court often has considered 
whether a regulation affects ―core‖ First Amendment speech or low-value 
speech that offers little contribution to the ―marketplace of ideas.‖180  
e.  Effect on Rights of Others 
Language in Tinker suggests that interference with the rights of others 
is an alternative prong to demonstration of a substantial disruption to 
justify regulation of student speech.
181
 Courts, however, have rightly been 
hesitant to rely on that justification for regulation.
182
 Applied literally, 
Tinker‘s interference with the rights of others prong might eliminate all 
student First Amendment speech rights. After all, other students arguably 
have a right not to be captive to unwanted speech.
183
 Nonetheless, to the 
                                                                                                                     
 178. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 427 (1974) (Marshall, J., concurring); Baker, 
supra note 138, at 994; Chemerinsky, supra note 46, at 23. 
 179. Moreover, the interests in self-expression and personal autonomy are largely protected by 
the ability to express oneself freely outside school supervision. 
 180. See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 403 (2007) (―Political speech . . . is ‗at the 
core of what the First Amendment is designed to protect.‘‖ (quoting Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 
343, 365 (2003) (plurality opinion))); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 680 (1986) 
(noting the distinction between the political message in Tinker and the sexual message in Fraser‘s 
speech); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 762 (1982) (noting that the First Amendment value of 
child pornography is exceedingly modest). 
 181. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969). 
 182. See sources cited supra note 19. 
 183. See Phelps-Roper v. Strickland, 539 F.3d 356, 363 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Hill v. 
Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 716–18 (2000)). 
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extent the determination of whether there is a substantial disruption 
requires a balancing of interests, it is natural to consider the challenged 
speech‘s effects on other students. For example, one might distinguish 
between a T-shirt that says, ―Homosexuality is a sin‖ and one that says a 
particular student is sinful because he is gay, based upon the differential 
effects upon that student. The latter message is likely to bring greater 
attention and embarrassment to and increased harassment of the targeted 
student. Consideration of the rights of others even more clearly deserves 
weight where a school‘s failure to act may subject it to a lawsuit for 
negligent supervision or harassment.
184
  
f.  Age of Students 
The age of the student disciplined and her audience also should be 
considered. The younger the audience, the more impressionable and 
vulnerable it may be and the greater the damage that can be done by some 
poorly chosen words.
185
 The younger the speaker, the more important it is 
to teach discipline and manners and the less likely that the speaker would 
be making a significant contribution to the ―marketplace of ideas.‖186 By 
recognizing that age may be relevant to determining whether school 
discipline is justified, however, I do not suggest that minors have no First 
Amendment rights at all. The law is clearly to the contrary.
187
 
g.  Criticism of School Officials 
Where the student has criticized school officials, less deference should 
be given to administrators‘ disciplinary decisions.188 When school officials 
are criticized, their objectivity is compromised. Furthermore, the student‘s 
speech can be considered political and his self-expression may reduce the 
frequency of more objectionable behavior. A reviewing court must ensure 
that the basis for what might otherwise be punishable conduct is not mere 
pretext for the administrator‘s hurt feelings.  
h.  Experience 
Experience with a type of speech is relevant to assess the likelihood and 
seriousness of a potential disruption. If similar speech generally has created 
disruptions in the past, an administrator‘s prediction of a future disruption 
should be considered reasonable.
189
 Obviously, evidence of the actual 
disruption experienced also is relevant. 
 
                                                                                                                     
 184. See Nuxoll v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist. No. 204, 523 F.3d 668, 675 (7th Cir. 2008). 
 185. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 272 (1988). 
 186. See Muller v. Jefferson Lighthouse Sch., 98 F.3d 1530, 1538 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 187. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 396 (2007) (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. 
Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)). 
 188. See Chandler v. McMinnville Sch. Dist., 978 F.2d 524, 531 (9th Cir. 1992).  
 189. A prior experience of disruption is most relevant if it occurred at the same school under 
similar circumstances. However, administrators and judges may consider prior experiences at other 
schools. 
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3.  Concluding Thoughts About the Proposed Balancing Test for 
Speech Under School Supervision 
As with any balancing test, there will be fact patterns where the relevant 
factors may be difficult to apply, and results may be unpredictable. For 
example, is disciplining a student for an anti-homosexuality message 
content-neutral or content-based when the speech is found to violate a 
school policy requiring civility? Does discipline silence a political or 
religious message, or is the student‘s message just a gratuitous attack on 
particular individuals? Does the speech violate the fundamental value in 
tolerance of others, or does it further the fundamental value in morality?  
In cases of doubt, deference should be given to the findings of school 
administrators,
190
 at least where the discipline is not viewpoint-based. 
School officials are in a better position to evaluate the effects of a student‘s 
speech, and de novo review of officials‘ decisions could create a flood of 
litigation. Open-ended balancing with deference to administrators should 
discourage much litigation because administrators‘ qualified immunity will 
preclude a damages award in all but the worst cases.
191
 Deference, 
however, is not abdication.
192
 The courts need to protect against the worst 
cases of abuse to prevent creation of a totalitarian state and to teach 
students about the value of their constitutional rights. Moreover, the extent 
of deference suggested is only legitimate if, as is also recommended, 
students have full First Amendment rights when not under school 
supervision. Only under those circumstances do students truly have 
alternate channels of communication open and can the suggested balancing 
be justified under the First Amendment.
193
 
D.  Classifying Speech as Outside or Under School Supervision when 
There Are Elements of Both 
Under the proposed comprehensive approach to school speech cases, it 
is critical to distinguish speech under school supervision from speech 
outside school supervision. Unfortunately, in today‘s technological age, 
that distinction is not self-defining, and cases often have both on-campus 
and off-campus elements. For example, a defamatory Web posting may be 
created at home but accessed at school. 
Based upon analogies to more traditional communication methods, this 
Article recommends that student speech should be classified as under 
school supervision when the student‘s conduct that is the basis for 
                                                                                                                     
 190. See Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 863–64 (1982) (―The Court has long recognized 
that local school boards have broad discretion in the management of school affairs. . . . [Court 
precedent] reaffirmed that . . . federal courts should not ordinarily ‗intervene in the resolution of 
conflicts which arise in the daily operation of school systems.‘‖); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 
651, 681–82 (1977).  
 191. See supra notes 96–98 and accompanying text. 
 192. See Pico, 457 U.S. at 864. 
 193. See supra note 104. 
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discipline occurred under school supervision.
194
 If the challenged conduct 
is the act of creating a Web posting, the relevant inquiry is where the 
posting was created. If the challenge is to the message‘s posting, where and 
under what circumstances the message was published determine whether 
the message should be considered communicated under school supervision. 
Of course, even if one concludes that the challenged behavior occurred 
under school supervision, discipline would not be appropriate unless the 
speech caused a substantial disruption or was otherwise subject to 
discipline under applicable Supreme Court precedent.
195
 A few examples 
can illustrate.  
If a student created a lewd Internet profile of the school principal on 
MySpace using his home computer that is accessed by the principal at 
school, the student‘s speech should be considered outside school 
supervision. The site‘s creation clearly occurred outside school 
supervision. The communication should not be considered on-campus 
because the student did not communicate it under school supervision. 
Access by others who are on campus alone cannot be sufficient to consider 
a computer posting published under school supervision. In the computer 
age, too much can be accessed from school. Letters to the editor of the New 
York Times or short stories in magazines can be accessed from school. For 
that matter, the principal‘s reading of the posting at school entails no more 
school involvement than if the student wrote a letter to the New York Times 
and the principal read the letter when he took the Times to his office. Thus, 
even if the site caused a substantial disruption at the school, discipline 
would not be appropriate. To consider the student as having published a 
site under school supervision, the student should have to access the site at 
school and show others or tell others to access the site while they are at 
school. If the site were published under school supervision, it would be 
subject to discipline under Fraser because it was lewd, whether or not 
there was a substantial disruption. 
If the same profile was created while at school, the message could not 
be directly disciplined unless the student also made the publication at 
school. However, discipline could be justified for the creation of the profile 
if the student made unauthorized use of school computers or Web 
resources not open to the general public.
196
 Schools should have the right 
to control the use of their property that does not function as a public 
forum,
197
 and they could adopt any rule for its use, including a rule 
                                                                                                                     
 194. If a student advocates others to engage in punishable activity while they are at school, the 
student should be considered under school supervision as a co-conspirator regardless of where the 
advocacy took place. Cf. Boucher v. Sch. Bd., 134 F.3d 821, 828–29 (7th Cir. 1998) (vacating 
preliminary injunction of student‘s expulsion after the student authored an article in an underground 
newspaper describing how to hack into the school‘s computer and encouraging others to do so). 
 195. See supra notes 25–74 and accompanying text. 
 196. The creation of the profile obviously could be subject to discipline if the student 
improperly took class time to create the profile. See Coy v. Bd. of Educ., 205 F. Supp. 2d 791, 799–
800 (N.D. Ohio 2002). 
 197. If government property is a public forum, then the state‘s right to limit private speech is 
―‗sharply circumscribed.‘‖ Gold v. Wilson Cnty. Sch. Bd. of Educ., 632 F. Supp. 2d 771, 786 
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precluding use of school computers to create anything that is likely to 
cause a substantial disruption at school. In this way, the school might 
indirectly discipline the student‘s message.  
Discipline for unauthorized use of school computers or improperly 
taking class time to create a site is justified as legitimate conduct, not 
speech, regulation. If a student created the site on his own laptop during 
recess, there would be no basis for disciplining the creation of the site. 
Even though the creation would be considered under school supervision, 
the mere creation would not have caused a substantial disruption or 
otherwise fall within Supreme Court precedents. These results correspond 
to the results of similar student conduct without the use of a computer. If a 
student writes a note to transmit to another, the student could be 
disciplined for wasting class time or for the content of the note if it was 
communicated. No discipline would be appropriate if it was created during 
recess and not communicated. Continuing with this analogy, 
communications that are created and received instantaneously, such as 
instant messages or phone calls, should be treated like the sent note (or in-
school conversation)—the creation and communication should be 
considered under school supervision.
198
  
III.  ILLUSTRATIVE APPLICATION TO LOWER COURT CASES 
This Article‘s comprehensive approach to student speech cases is best 
illustrated by reviewing some of the most recent reported lower court 
cases. 
A.  Layshock v. Hermitage School District
199
 
In Layshock, a high school student created a parody profile of the 
school principal on the website MySpace from his grandmother‘s house 
during non-school hours.
200
 The profile was arguably vulgar, emphasizing 
the principal‘s large size.201 As part of the profile, the student posted a 
photograph of the principal taken from the school district‘s website.202 
―[W]ord of the profile ‗spread like wildfire‘ and soon reached most, if not 
all,‖ of the student body.203 On December 15, the student accessed the 
profile during his Spanish class and showed it to some of his classmates.
204
 
On another occasion, a teacher had to tell a group of students who were 
                                                                                                                     
(M.D. Tenn. 2009) (quoting Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 761 
(1995); Perry Educ. Ass‘n v. Perry Local Educators‘ Ass‘n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)).  
 198. Of course, the recipient also might be subject to discipline for engaging in instant 
messaging or accepting a phone call during inappropriate times. 
 199. 593 F.3d 249 (3d Cir. 2010), reh‟g en banc granted, opinion vacated, No. 07-4465, 2010 
U.S. App. LEXIS 7362 (3d Cir. Apr. 9, 2010). 
 200. Id. at 252. 
 201. Id. at 252–53. 
 202. Id. at 252. 
 203. Id. at 253. 
 204. Id. 
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congregating around a computer and giggling to close the parody down.
205
 
A number of teachers called the co-principal on December 15 to report that 
students wanted to discuss the profile during class.
206
 Administrators were 
not able to block students from accessing the site because the technology 
coordinator was on vacation.
207
 Instead, the school precluded student use 
of computers except in the computer lab and library where the students 
could be supervised.
208
 On December 21, the school learned the name of 
the student who created the profile.
209
 Without prompting from anyone, the 
student apologized to the principal for creating the profile, and his parents 
punished him.
210
 At the beginning of the following year, the school district 
held an informal hearing after which it disciplined the student.
211
 
Analysis of the above fact pattern under this Article‘s approach would 
begin with identifying what speech and conduct occurred under school 
supervision. The creation of the website parody and the copying of the 
principal‘s photo did not occur on campus and therefore would be subject 
to full First Amendment rights. The student‘s access of the site at school 
combined with his showing it to some of his classmates constituted speech 
under school supervision. Access by other students on campus alone 
should not be attributed to the disciplined student. 
The speech outside school supervision does not fall under any 
exception to First Amendment protection and therefore would be protected 
speech. The speech under school supervision was properly disciplined if it 
could be considered ―lewd, vulgar and offensive‖ under Fraser or to have 
created a ―substantial disruption‖ under Tinker.212 The website might be 
considered lewd, vulgar, and offensive,
213
 and accordingly, its publication 
on campus properly would be subject to discipline. If Fraser did not apply, 
it would be necessary to decide if the school district had properly found 
                                                                                                                     
 205. Id. 
 206. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 496 F. Supp. 2d 587, 592 (W.D. Pa. 2007), aff‟d, 593 
F.3d 249 (3d Cir. 2010), reh‟g en banc granted, opinion vacated, No. 07-4465, 2010 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 7362 (3d Cir. Apr. 9, 2010). 
 207. Layshock, 593 F.3d at 253. 
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. at 254. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. As punishment, the student was (1) placed in the Alternative Educational Program, a 
program ―typically reserved for students with behavior and attendance problems who are unable to 
function in a regular classroom,‖ for the rest of the year; (2) banned from all extracurricular 
activities; and (3) prohibited from participating in his graduation ceremony. Id. at 254. ―Prior to 
creating the Myspace profile, Justin was classified as a gifted student, was enrolled in advance 
placement classes, and had won awards at interscholastic academic competitions.‖ Id. at 254 n.6. 
 212. The speech could not be attributed to the school and did not advocate illegal conduct. 
Therefore, Kuhlmeier and Morse have no application. 
 213. The district court so found but ruled for the plaintiff because the website was created off 
campus. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 496 F. Supp. 2d 587, 599–600 (W.D. Pa. 2007), aff‟d, 
593 F.3d 249 (3d Cir. 2010), reh‟g en banc granted, opinion vacated, No. 07-4465, 2010 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 7362 (3d Cir. Apr. 9, 2010). The court did not view the student‘s publication of the 
speech on campus as subjecting the speech to Fraser‘s standard. Id. 
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that the sharing of the website with other students during Spanish class 
created a substantial disruption. Given that the website was accessed 
during class, the speech could be viewed as affecting curricular matters, for 
which school discretion is at its greatest. Regulation of the speech does not 
seem to be viewpoint-based, although it might be thought of as content-
based. Nonetheless, the discipline did not threaten political institutions—
the speech was a sophomoric attempt at humor and not a critique of the 
government or its officials. In plaintiff‘s favor is that the speech did not 
affect the rights of other students,
214
 and the student and his audience were 
relatively old. Also, the speech did insult a school administrator. As such, 
there is a greater risk that the alleged basis of the discipline is a pretext for 
revenge. The risk is not as great as it could be where, as here, the insulted 
administrator was not responsible for the disciplinary decision. However, 
objectivity still may be compromised by a desire to protect and defend 
subordinates or others with whom the decisionmaker regularly works. The 
severity of the punishment given the extent of disruption might make a 
court particularly sensitive to the objectivity of the decisionmaker. 
Accessing a website and showing it to others during class certainly has the 
potential to cause a substantial disruption. It appears, however, that the 
teacher was unaware of the student‘s behavior,215 and it is unclear whether 
other students were actually disturbed. There is little question that the need 
to limit use of the computers and to respond to student demands to talk 
about the site during class could be considered a ―substantial disruption.‖ 
The issue would be whether that disruption was the result of the site‘s 
creation or the publication at school. Given the difficulty in making this 
determination, this Article would presume it was the result of the student‘s 
on-campus conduct unless the student could prove otherwise. The 
student‘s protection is simply not to access the site or show others at 
school. Ultimately, the decision to discipline the student in Layshock 
should have been found constitutional.
216
 The on-campus publication had 
little value; the student could adequately express himself by creation of the 
site and its sharing outside school supervision; the speech was vulgar and 
did create some disruption; and the school district‘s decision should be 
given some deference as it was not viewpoint-based. While troubled by the 
extent and appropriateness of the discipline given the violation and the 
prior history of the student, those concerns are more fittingly reviewed 
under a due process or equal protection analysis.
217
  
 
 
                                                                                                                     
 214. The speech obviously affected the principal, but the principal cannot be viewed as 
vulnerable, and the school does not have a custodial responsibility to the principal. 
 215. Layshock, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 601. 
 216. The district court found that there was not a substantial disruption, and the school district 
did not appeal that ruling. Layshock, 593 F.3d at 260–61. 
 217. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Such challenges might be especially attractive given 
that there were three other more vulgar websites that went unpunished. Layshock, 593 F.3d at 253–
54. 
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B.  J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain School District
218
  
J.S., a fourteen-year-old eighth grader, and a friend of hers created a 
fictitious profile of her principal on MySpace using her parents‘ home 
computer.
219
 The profile did not state the principal‘s name but used a 
photograph of him taken from the school district‘s website.220 The profile 
contained profanity-laced statements insinuating that the principal was a 
sex addict and pedophile.
221
 J.S. created the profile as a joke and because 
she was mad at the principal due to the way he treated her for an earlier 
dress code violation.
222
 The day after the profile was created, several 
students approached J.S. at school and told her they found the site funny.
223
 
That evening, J.S. made the profile ―private‖ limiting access to twenty-two 
other students who were given friends status.
224
 Two teachers had to quiet 
their classes when students talked about the profile.
225
 The school 
computers block access to MySpace, so students could only view the site 
from an off-campus location.
226
 After meeting with the students and their 
parents, the principal suspended J.S. and her friend for ten days.
227
 The 
enraged principal also threatened legal action and contacted the police.
228
 
Two students decorated the offending students‘ lockers welcoming them 
back to school following their suspension.
229
 
Under this Article‘s proposed approach, the school discipline was 
unconstitutional. All of J.S.‘s and her friend‘s challenged actions took 
place outside school supervision.
230
 The principal, however, might pursue 
claims of criminal harassment or defamation.
231
   
If the speech in J.S. had occurred on campus, it would certainly have 
been subject to discipline under Fraser. If it had occurred on campus, 
whether the speech could be disciplined under Tinker would be a close 
question. The analysis would be similar to that described above for 
Layshock.
232
 Obviously, since the speech occurring on campus is merely 
hypothetical, it is impossible to know the location of the speech or the 
disruption that the speech itself (as opposed to the website‘s creation) 
caused. Although the students‘ relatively young age would militate in favor 
                                                                                                                     
 218. 593 F.3d 286 (3d Cir. 2010), reh‟g en banc granted, opinion vacated, No. 08-4138, 2010 
U.S. App. LEXIS 7342 (3d Cir. Apr. 9, 2010). 
 219. Id. at 290–91. 
 220. Id. at 291. 
 221. Id. 
 222. Id. at 291–92. 
 223. Id. at 292. 
 224. Id. 
 225. Id. at 293. 
 226. Id. at 292. 
 227. Id. at 293. 
 228. Id. 
 229. Id. at 294. 
 230. The court of appeals upheld the school discipline applying Tinker to ―off-campus speech 
that causes or reasonably threatens to cause a substantial disruption.‖ Id. at 301. 
 231. Id. at 301–02 & n.9. 
 232. See supra notes 199–216 and accompanying text. 
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of discipline, deference would be limited given that the original 
decisionmaker was the very person who had been defamed.  
C.  Mardis v. Hannibal Public School District
233
 
In Mardis, the plaintiff student was chatting via instant messages on a 
private computer with a friend outside of school hours.
234
 In that October 
24, 2006, conversation, the plaintiff told his friend that he was going to get 
a gun and kill certain classmates.
235
 The friend responded with 
encouragement and laughter, suggesting that ―the [p]laintiff should shoot 
all of the black women because ‗[t]he death of a black person cracks me 
up.‘‖236 Nonetheless, within hours, the friend forwarded the plaintiff‘s 
message to school administrators.
237
 The police arrested the plaintiff on 
charges of making those threats, and upon order of the juvenile court, he 
was admitted to a hospital‘s psychiatric ward.238 Upon release from the 
hospital on October 30, 2006, the plaintiff was returned to the juvenile 
court and remained in juvenile detention through February 9, 2007.
239
 On 
October 31, 2006, the day following the plaintiff‘s release from the 
psychiatric ward, the school district suspended the plaintiff for ten days.
240
 
On November 3, 2006, the district‘s superintendent extended the plaintiff‘s 
suspension through the end of the school year.
241
 As a result of the 
plaintiff‘s threat, the school was inundated with calls from concerned 
parents and forced to significantly increase its security.
242
 
According to the approach recommended by this Article, the 
superintendent properly suspended the plaintiff in Mardis. The student‘s 
communications were entirely outside school supervision and, therefore, 
were entitled to the same First Amendment protection as a non-student. 
Nonetheless, even under normal First Amendment standards, the plaintiff‘s 
speech was properly considered a true threat. There was some indication 
that the plaintiff‘s friend interpreted the plaintiff‘s threats as a joke.243 
However, given the friend‘s immediate report of the threat, the police 
arrest, and hospital commitment, the school administrators‘ conclusion that 
the plaintiff communicated ―a serious expression of an intent to commit an 
act of unlawful violence‖244 had more than adequate support.245  
                                                                                                                     
 233. 684 F. Supp. 2d 1114 (E.D. Mo. 2010). 
 234. Id. at 1115. 
 235. Id.  
 236. Id. at 1121. 
 237. Id. at 1119. 
 238. Id. at 1115. 
 239. Id. 
 240. Id. 
 241. Id. at 1116. 
 242. Id. at 1123–24. 
 243. Id. at 1121. 
 244. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003). 
 245. The court in Mardis upheld the school‘s discipline both as a ―true threat‖ and under 
Tinker‘s ―substantial disruption‖ standard. Mardis, 684 F. Supp. 2d at 1119, 1124. This Article‘s 
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CONCLUSION 
Student speech cases dominate courts‘ First Amendment dockets. 
Confusion seems to be the rule. This Article has recommended a 
comprehensive approach to such cases that is consistent with Supreme 
Court precedent and best balances students‘, schools‘, and the public‘s 
interests. When student speech occurs outside of school supervision, the 
speech should receive the same First Amendment protection as a non-
student‘s speech. Speech outside school supervision does not implicate the 
―essential characteristics‖ of the school environment that justify special 
First Amendment treatment of student speech. Providing full First 
Amendment protection to off-campus speech also has the benefit of clarity. 
Moreover, by giving students full protection for such speech, one can 
justify tighter restrictions of on-campus speech where school regulation is 
most necessary. With alternate channels of communication open, 
regulation of on-campus speech obviously raises fewer First Amendment 
concerns.  
When student speech occurs under school supervision, great deference 
should be given to administrators‘ disciplinary decisions, especially when 
not viewpoint-based. Constant review is undesirable and, with alternate 
channels of expression available, is generally unnecessary. Many 
restrictions on First Amendment rights are simply required for a school to 
run efficiently. Nonetheless, deference cannot justify abdication. 
Unregulated restrictions of student speech, particularly with mandatory 
attendance laws, can lead to a totalitarian state. Under Supreme Court 
precedent, speech on campus can be regulated if it is lewd, advocates drug 
use, bears the school‘s imprimatur, or is likely to create a ―substantial 
disruption‖ on campus. This Article has identified a number of factors for 
courts to consider when determining whether speech is likely to cause a 
substantial disruption. Although not always self-defining, the 
recommended factors can reduce the amount of ad hoc decisionmaking and 
best balance the respective interests involved in student speech regulation. 
                                                                                                                     
proposal would find the latter holding erroneous as the student‘s conduct occurred entirely outside 
school supervision. 
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